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What initiated the battle?

 

  • The Russian commander Grand Duke Nicholas agreed to help relieve the French under attack from Germany, with an offensive in East Prussia.

 

What the main goal was?

 

  • The goal was to converge Rennenkampf's First Army with the Samsonov's Second Army and to give a two-to-one numerical superiority over the German 8th Army

  • To attack 8th Army from the east and south respectively, 80km apart. The German 8th Army was under the leadership of Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff

 

What happened?

 

  • The Russian 1st Army, under General Pavel Rennenkampf, advanced to the northeastern corner of East Prussia

  •  General Aleksandr Samsonov 2nd Army made headway into the southwest

  •  Russian side victory in the Battle of Gumbinnen on August 20

  • Rennenkampf paused to regroup his forces.

  • Two Russian armies were separated by the great Masurian Lakes, which will be shown as one of the key reasons for their lost…

  • Because of Masurian Lakes between them, they were unable to effectively communicate with each other as to their movements - a circumstance that would prove deadly.

 

Key points of the battle: intercepted two Russian messages.

 

 

The Germans got lucky by intercepting two uncoded Russian messages:

  • The first, sent by Rennenkampf, revealed the distance between his and Samsonov’s armies. It further indicated that Rennenkampf was in no hurry to advance. The importance of the message was clear: the Germans need not fear intervention from the Russian First Army during their assault upon Samsonov’s forces.

  • The second intercepted message, from Samsonov provided detailed plans for his intended route of pursuit of the German forces

 

                                    The BATTLE…

On 22 August

 

  • the majority of Samsonov’s forces reached the German line extremities, fighting and winning small actions

  • Samsonov’s forces continued to advance into the German trap of encirclement.

  • Samsonov's forces encountered Germans all along their front and pushed them back.

  • Russians already had been advancing for six days in torrid heat without sufficient rest along primitive roads, averaging 24 km a day and

  • Russian forces had outrun their supplies

 

On 23 August

 

  • Russians attacked the German XX Corps

 

On 24 August

 

  • The Russians attacked again; the now partially entrenched

  • XX German Corps temporarily stopped Russian advance

  • XX Corps retreating to avoid possible encirclement.

  • The German chief of staff of the corps directed artillery fire onto his own dwelling.

  • Both of Samsonov’s flanks were unopposed. He ordered most of his units to the northwest

  • Samsonov did not have enough aircraft or skilled cavalry to detect the German buildup on his left.

  • Along the way they drove through the village of Tannenberg

  • Germans knew about Samsonov’s proposed movements from a wireless intercept that agreed perfectly with papers found on the body of a Russian officer killed at Gumbinnen.

Tannenberg battle in WW1

On 25 August

 

 

  • Ludendorff sent the two corps

  • They met and brought into action Samsonov’s VI Corps moving northwards at Bischofsburg.

  • Surprised and disorganized, both divisions retreated separately for the Russian border.

  • I Corps was ordered to attack the Russian left wing.

 

On 26 August:

  • Zhilinksi directed Rennenkampf’s First Army to the west to Konigsberg

  • Germans intercepted uncoded wireless messages from both Samsonov and Rennenkampf

  • François advanced part of his 1st Division toward the Russian outposts at 08:00, where—despite telephone prodding from the Eighth Army—they only skirmished at a distance until noon.

  • Finally they drove the Russian outposts back,

  • at 15:45 François halted in order to organize a strong attack on the following day by men with full stomachs and ammunition pouches.

  • Scholtz followed his orders, which were to make sure that Russians were not slipping past his flanks, which would make it difficult to spring the trap.

  • On his right he attacked to push back the Russian 2nd Division and almost destroyed it.

  • On his left the German 3rd Reserve Division repelled an attack by the Russian VI Corps.

  • It was a different story in the thinly held center, where the Russian XIII Corps advanced toward the road center of Allenstein almost unopposed.

  • In fact, XVII Corps had defeated the Russian VI Corps, which fled back along the roads.

  • The rest of the German forces coming onto their left wing were swinging into place by forced marches.

  • Samsonov’s II Army was now facing Germans along a 100 km line.

  • Ludendorff ordered an attack on Samsonov's left wing near Usdau.

  • German artillery forced a Russian retreat, whereupon they were pursued in the rear of the Russian centre.

 

on 27 August:

 

  • François attacked the Russian left decisively, hitting I Russian Corps.

  • His artillery barrage was overwhelming, and soon he had taken the key town of Usdau.

  • In the center, the Russians continued to strongly attack the German XX Corps and to move northwest from Allenstein.

  • The German XVII Corps and I Reserve Corps pushed the Russian right wing further back.

  • Germans rapidly took Sold on the Russian border

  • Communication with Samsonov’s center are cut

  • German forces confined Samsonov’s left to the frontier.

  •  

On 28 August
 
  • On the morning the German commanders were motoring along the front when they were shown a report from an aerial observer that Rennenkampf was moving towards their rear.

  • Samsonov’s forces forces were dispersed

  • Samsonov’s I Corps on the left and VI Corps on the right were both retreating.

  •  VI corps had been defeated.

  • Samsonov’s center had received so little food and ammunition that they were unable to keep attacking.

  • Samsonov asked that Rennenkampf be ordered to help. It was too late.

  • The Russians who had been attacking were surrounded.

  • Samsonov ordered a general withdrawal on the evening.

 

On 29 August

 

  • the Russian Second Army’s troops entered into a German defensive line.

  • Two Russian army corps escaped before the German pursuit continued.

  • Russians who tried break through by dashing across open fields heavy with crops were mown down at Frogenau, east of Tannenberg, and throughout the day were relentlessly pounded by artillery.

  • Many surrendered—long columns of prisoners jammed the roads away from the battleground.

  • By nightfall on 29 August the Russian centre, amounting to three army corps, was surrounded by Germans and stuck in a forest with no means of escape.

 

On 30 August

 

  • the Russians tried unsuccessfully to break open the snare.

  • Samsonov disappeared in the woods that night and committed suicide.

 

On 31 August

 

  • three Russian army corps (XIII, XV and XXIII) had been destroyed.

  • The two corps (I and VI) were retreating to Poland.

 

 

Battle epilogue:

 

  • Samsonov’s forces (around 150,000 initialy): 92,000 captured, between 30,000 - 78,000 killed or wounded and only 10,000 escaping. The Russians had lost 350 big guns. Russia lost 13 generals and 350-500 guns

  • The Germans: suffered fewer than 20,000 casualties and, in addition to prisoners captured over 500 guns.

  • Samsonov shot himself in the surrounding forests.

Additional INFO

War Infographic is telling a story from WW1:

THE BATTLE OF TANNENBERG

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